Abstract. The relation between agentive action, knowledge, and obligation is central to the understanding of responsibility -a main topic in Artificial Intelligence. Based on the view that an appropriate formalization of said relation would contribute to the development of ethical AI, we point out the main characteristics of a logic for objective and subjective oughts that was recently introduced in the literature. This logic extends the traditional stit paradigm with deontic and epistemic operators, and provides a semantics that deals with Horty's puzzles for knowledge and obligation. We provide an axiomatization for this logic, and address its soundness and completeness with respect to a class of relevant models.
Introduction
AI developers face a big challenge in creating systems that are expected to make ethically charged decisions. The field of machine ethics has seen a quick growth in recent years, and questions regarding responsibility of autonomous agents are very important. In our opinion, these questions can be categorized in two main trends: 1) conceptual questions that deal with the ontology and essential components of the notion of responsibility, and 2) technical questions concerning the implementation of such notion in AI. This work attempts to make a contribution in the technical category. We take part in a very specific line of research, where proof systems of deontic logic are intended to help in the testing of ethical behavior of AI through theorem proving ( [1] , [9] , [3] ). That being said, answers to the technical kind of questions typically presuppose a particular choice of philosophical standpoint against questions of the first kind, the conceptual one. Our philosophical standpoint comes from John Horty's framework of act utilitarian stit logic ( [8] ), extended with epistemic relations. As such, we make explicit the goal of the present paper: to provide well-behaved formalizations of 3 essential components of responsibility of intelligent systems: agentive action, knowledge, and obligation.
According to [1] , having an expressive deontic logic with practical relevance and an efficient algorithm for proving theorem-hood is highly applicable in the construction of logic-based ethical robots. 3 To support this statement, Arkoudas et al. present in [1] a natural deduction calculus for a logic of ought-to-do that was developed by Horty in [8] and axiomatised by Murakami in [9] . With an interactive theorem proving system named ATHENA, they illustrate the fact that we can mechanize deontic logic to do machine ethics.
The starting point of our work comes from a recent interest in enhancing both the expressivity and practical relevance of Horty's stit theory of ought-to-do in order to deal with situations in which agents' knowledge becomes significant. Inspired by 3 puzzles for knowledge-dependent obligations that pose a problem for merely extending his initial logic with epistemic operators, Horty presents in [6] a novel semantics for epistemic oughts based on action types. Although the approach is substantial, it comes with 3 disadvantages: (1) it diverges from his work in [8] , (2) there are semantic constraints that limit the expressivity of the models, and (3) the use of action types precludes an efficient axiomatization. 4 With similar motivations as Horty, the extended abstract [5] proposes an alternative logic -where the main idea is to distinguish objective from subjective obligations-that allegedly mitigates the disadvantages mentioned above. The authors claim that this logic is simpler, more naturally connected to Horty's work in [8] , and axiomatizable. Being very brief, [5] only deals with the conceptual benefits of the proposal, and the proof of soundness and completeness of the logic's proof system is only mentioned. Here, we recover the definition of this logic, address its benefits, and show that its proof system is indeed sound and complete with respect to a class of relevant models. We do this hoping that the results will give some background to new developments in the mechanization of deontic logic for ethical AI, in the aforementioned tradition of [1] and [3] .
The paper is structured as follows. After a short presentation of stit and its aplications in the modeling of action, knowledge, and obligation, we go through Horty's puzzles. We mention his solution to them and justify the claim that his approach with action types comes with disadvantages. Afterwards, we present the logic developed by [5] , show how it solves Horty's puzzles, and deal with its axiomatizability. 5 
Action, Knowledge, and Obligation in Stit
We want to consider oughts from the perspective that an agent should be excused for having failed at an obligation if it lacks the necessary knowledge to perform a required task (doctors ought to stop the bleeding of the patient, but if they do not know how to, they should be excused). A typical framework for expressing statements that involve knowledge for required tasks as a component of responsibility is stit logic ( [2] ). Stit logic was created to formalize the concept of action, so it naturally lent itself to the study of obligation ( [8] ) and of knowingly doing ( [4] ), all important elements in the notion of responsibility. For a comprehensive review of the interaction of these 3 concepts in the literature, we refer the reader to [11] .
The 3 puzzles of Horty that we mentioned in the introduction are actually very good illustrations of how stit deals with action, knowledge, and obligation, but in order to tackle them we need to recover basic definitions of the paradigm known as act utilitarian stit logic. In this paradigm, obligation stems from a dominance ordering over the set of available actions. The idea is that the effects of the best actions in the ordering -the so-called optimal actions-are the obligations of a given agent at a given moment. We proceed to introduce the basic aspects of an extension of act utilitarian stit logic with epistemic modalities, and leave its examples to the section where we present Horty's puzzles.
Definition 1 (Syntax). Given a finite set Ags of agent names, a countable set of propositions P such that p ∈ P and α ∈ Ags, the grammar for the formal language L KO is given by:
ϕ is meant to express the 'historical necessity' of ϕ (♦ϕ abbreviates ¬ ¬ϕ).
[α]ϕ stands for 'agent α sees to it that ϕ'. K α is the epistemic operator for α. Finally, ⊙[α]ϕ is meant to represent that α ought to see to it that ϕ.
As for the semantics, the structures in which we evaluate formulas of the language L KO are based on what we call epistemic act utilitarian branching time frames.
Definition 2 (Branching time (BT) frames). A finite-choice epistemic act utilitarian
BT -frame is a tuple T, ⊏, Choice, {∼ α } α∈Ags , Value such that: [2] for a discussion of the property).
-For α ∈ Ags, ∼ α is the epistemic indistinguishability equivalence relation for agent α. -Value is a deontic function that assigns to each history h ∈ H a real number, representing the utility of h.
As mentioned before, the idea is that obligations come from the optimal actions for a given agent. The optimality of such actions is relative to a dominance ordering of the actions, and this ordering is given by the value of the histories in those actions -itself provided by Value. In order to present the semantics for formulas involving the oughtto-do operator, we therefore need some previous definitions. For α ∈ Ags and m * ∈ T , we define a dominance ordering on Choice
The optimal set of actions, then, is taken as Optimal
As is customary, the models and the semantics for the formulas are defined by adding a valuation function to the frames of Definition 2: 
Satisfiability, validity on a frame, and general validity are defined as usual. We write |ϕ| m to refer to the set {h ∈ H m ; M, m, h |= ϕ}.
Horty's Puzzles
The 3 puzzles that we have mentioned since the beginning of the paper, and that pose a problem for formalizing epistemic oughts just with the epistemic extension of act utilitarian logic, can be summarized as follows.
Example 1. Agent β places a coin on top of a table -either heads up or tails up-but hides it from agent α. Agent α can bet that the coin is heads up, that it is tails up, or it can refrain from betting. If α bets and chooses correctly, it wins e10. If it chooses incorrectly, it does not win anything, and if it refrains from betting, it wins e5. The stit diagram that represents Horty's interpretation of the situation is included in Figure 1 . In this diagram, we take H to denote the proposition 'β places the coin heads up', T to denote 'β places the coin tails up', BH to denote 'α bets heads', BT to denote 'α bets tails', and G to denote 'α gambles'. In moment m 1 , β places the coin on top of the table, so that its available actions are labeled by L 1 (placing the coin heads up) and L 2 (placing the coin tails up). At moments m 2 and m 3 , it is α's turn to act, and the available actions are clear from the picture. The blue dotted line represents the epistemic class of α: since β is hiding the coin, α cannot distinguish whether it is at moment m 2 or m 3 . 6 For such an interpretation regarding the epistemic structure of the agent, a problem ensues due to the fact that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and h ∈ H mi , we have that m i , h |= K α ⊙[α]G. This means that α knows that it ought to gamble, even if this is a 'risky' move that could result in a payoff of 0. In this sense, we could say that the agent's knowledge of what is optimal would lead it into taking a chance and gambling.
Example 2. With the same scheme as in the previous example, if α bets and chooses correctly, it wins e10. If it refrains from betting, it also wins e10. If it bets incorrectly, it does not win anything.
Intuitively, α ought to refrain from gambling in this scenario, for refraining implies that it would win by the same amount as when betting correctly but without engaging in an action that could possibly fail. In this case, the problem is that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and h ∈ H mi , we have that m i , h |= K α ⊙[α]¬G: α does not know that it ought to refrain from gambling. Figure 2 includes the stit diagram for this scenario. Example 3. With the same scheme as in the previous examples, if α bets and chooses correctly, it wins e10. If it bets incorrectly or refrains from betting, it does not win anything.
The problem here is that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and
W , where W is the proposition that stands for 'α wins'. This means that α knows that it ought to win at any given situation, but such knowledge is not action-guiding, meaning that it will not provide α with a choice to make. Though the agent knowingly ought to win, it cannot knowingly do so -it simply does not have the means due to a lack of knowledge. Thus, Kant's principle of 'ought implies can' is not satisfied ( Figure 3 includes the stit diagram for this scenario. Horty solves these 3 puzzles by introducing both syntactic and semantic addenda to epistemic act utilitarian stit logic. He extends the language with an operator [... kstit] to encode the concept of ex interim knowledge (or knowingly doing). The semantics for formulas involving this operator uses action types, with the premise that actions of the same type may lead to different outcomes in different moments (see [7] ). Unfortunately, the introduction of the new operator and of types comes with two unfavorable semantic constraints:
1. In order for [... kstit] to be an S5 operator, the epistemic relations must ensue not between moment-history pairs but between moments. The problem with this condition is that it limits the class of models to those in which knowledge is momentdependent (agents will not be able to know that they perform a given action), 7 2. Indistinguishable moments must offer the same available types. The problem with this constraint is that it cannot be characterized syntactically without producing an infinite axiomatization. This is due to the fact that performing a certain action type can only be expressed syntactically with propositional constants (again, see [7] for the details). 8 As a solution to the stated puzzles, Horty's approach is successful. However, [5] claims that we can also be successful without using action types. The benefits of the framework presented in [5] , then, include technical characterizability of the constraints imposed on the structures -which is important for axiomatization-, semantic simplicity, and enhanced expressivity. In the following section, all these claims will be substantiated. 7 Horty's models satisfy the following constraint: if m, h ∼α m 8 It is an open problem to determine whether there is a finite axiomatization of Horty's logic of epistemic action and obligation if the types were also included in the object language.
3 A Logic of Objective and Subjective oughts [5] proposes to disambiguate two senses of ought-to-do in order to produce a system that solves Horty's puzzles, avoids action types, and is axiomatizable. The two senses are an objective one, which coincides with Horty's act utilitarian ought-to-do, and a subjective one, which arises from the epistemically best candidates in the set of available actions for a given agent. By 'epistemically best' we mean those actions that are undominated not only in the actual moment but whose all epistemic equivalents across different indistinguishable situations are also undominated. Essentially, we are talking about an extension of the language in Definition 1 with a new operator ⊙ S [α], meant to build up formulas that would express what α subjectively ought to do. As for the semantics of this new operator, it involves a dominance ordering as well, but one different to that which is used for objective ought-to-do's. In order to define this subjective dominance ordering, [5] introduces a new semantic concept known as epistemic clusters, which are nothing more than a given action's epistemic equivalents in situations that are indistinguishable to the actual one. Formally, we have that for α ∈ Ags, m * , m ∈ T , and L ⊆ H m * , L's epistemic cluster at m is the set
As a convention, we write m
The notion of epistemic clusters is used to define a subjective dominance ordering s on Choice
Just as in the case of objective ought-to-do's, this ordering allows us to define a subjectively optimal set of actions S − optimal m * α
The idea, then, is that something will be a subjective obligation of a given agent at a given moment if it is an effect of all the subjectively optimal actions of that agent at that moment.
As established in [5] , the models in which to evaluate the formulas of the extended language need to satisfy extra constraints in order to capture an appropriate interaction of action, knowledge, and subjective obligation. By this we mean to say that in these models (a) agents should be able to knowingly do the same things across epistemically indistinguishable states, (b) the subjective ought-to-do must conform to Kant's directive of 'ought implies can' in its epistemic version of 'subjectively ought-to-do implies ability of knowingly doing', and (c) if something is a subjective ought-to-do of a given agent, then the agent should know that that is the case. Therefore, we focus on models that fulfill the following requirements, which will grant the conditions mentioned above (as can be seen from the proof of soundness):
. We refer to this constraint as the 'own action condition', since it implies that agents do not know more than what they perform. Because of this constraint, the knowledge that we are formalizing here is of a very particular kind: to know something is just the same as to knowingly do it.
Combined with (OAC), this constraint is meant to capture a notion of uniformity of strategies, where epistemically indistinguishable situations should offer similar actions for the agent to choose upon. We call this condition 'uniformity of historical possibility'.
In finite-choice epistemic act utilitarian BT-models that satisfy these two constraints, then, the semantics for the formulas involving ⊙ S [α] is defined as expected:
Solution to Horty's Puzzles
The semantics for subjective ought-to-do's offers solutions to natural interpretations of Horty's puzzles, in which the assumption that the coin is hidden from the betting agent is captured by taking ∼ α to be defined by the following information sets:
in which α bets tails; and { m 2 , h 3 , m 3 , h 6 }, in which α refrains from betting. For Example 1, the problem is solved because although
G, we consider this as the knowledge of an objective ought-to-do. Subjectively speaking, we do not obtain that α knows that it ought to gamble: In Example 2, the problem is solved because
For Example 3, the problem is solved because we obtain that
. Therefore, although α knows that it objectively ought to win, it is not the case that it subjectively ought to win.
When comparing these solutions to Horty's, it is important to point out that the formalization we are using is different from his, for it presupposes that the indistinguishability relation for agent α ensues between situations. Regardless of such difference, the solution is virtually the same: for Example 1, Horty gets that for every 
Axiomatization and Some Logical Properties
In this section, we introduce a proof system for the logic presented, address its soundness and completeness results, and mention a few interesting properties of it.
Definition 4 (Proof system). Let Λ be the proof system defined by the following axioms and rules of inference: (Axioms)
-All classical tautologies from propositional logic.
-The following axiom schemata for the interactions of formulas with the given operators:
For n ≥ 1 and pairwise different α1, . . . , αn,
(Rules of inference)
-Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for the modal operators.
Schema (IA) encodes 'independence of agency'. (OAC) encodes the 'own action condition'. (U nif − H) encodes the 'uniformity of historical possibility' constraint.
(Oic) and (s.Oic) concern the objective, resp. subjective, versions of Kant's directive of 'ought implies can'. (s.N ) (standing for 'subjective necessity') captures that all that is historically necessary at epistemically indistinguishable situations must be a subjective obligation, and (Cl) (standing for 'closure') characterizes a property that says that if one subjectively ought to do something, then one knows that that is settled.
The axiom system Λ turns out to be sound and complete with respect to the class of epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models. Such models are more general than the ones introduced in Definition 3. Instead of only one value function, there are two: one for the objective ought-to-do's, and the other for the subjective ones.
10 These models, then, are of the form T, ⊏, Choice, {∼ α } α∈Ags , Value O , Value S . As such, the models in Definition 3 are particular instances of bi-valued models, in which both value functions assign the same value to each history of the tree.
Furthermore, our soundness and completeness results presuppose a logic of oughtto-do that deals with the 'sure-thing principle', according to which the ranking of the available actions of a given agent should take into consideration what all the other agents choose concurrently. For a given agent, the action profiles of the other agents are seen as the possible states in which the agent will act (see [8] , Chapter 4, subsection 4.1.2). We implement Horty's approach for dealing with the 'sure-thing principle' in the logic that we axiomatize, and this means that the semantics that we use is in fact a generalization of the one introduced before. In order to address such a generalization and the soundness and completeness results, we need further definitions:
For m ∈ T and β ∈ Ags, we define
With this notion of states, we redefine the dominance orderings so that the actions are measured taking into consideration the states which those actions are facing. For α ∈ Ags and m * ∈ T , we first define a general ordering ≤ on P(H m * ) such that
As for the subjective ought-to-do's, we first define a general ordering
With these definitions, we adapt the semantics for the formulas involving ought-todo operators, making the logic strong enough to deal with the 'sure-thing principle':
Soundness Proposition 1. The system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models.
Proof. Standard. See Appendix for details.
Completeness
For reasons of space, we can only summarize the proof here, leaving the full detailed exposition for the Appendix. The proof of completeness of Λ with respect to the class of epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models is a two-step process. First, we introduce relational structures called Kripke-estit models for evaluating the formulas of the language L KO under a semantics that mirrors the semantics of Definition 3, and prove completeness of Λ with respect to these structures via the technique of canonical models. Secondly, we provide a truth-preserving correspondence between Kripke-estit models and certain epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models, so that completeness with respect to Kripke-estit models grants it with respect to bi-valued BT-models. Essential to the success of the technique of canonical models is to prove the so-called existence and truth lemmas just as in modal logic. In the case of this particular proof system, these lemmas are quite involved, and the reader is encouraged to go over them in the Appendix, which offers enough room to address all their features carefully and with precision. In our opinion, the results of soundness and completeness are significant, all the more because we want to provide some theoretical foundations to the idea -explored by [1] -that we can actually do machine ethics via theorem-proving (or model-checking).
To end on a slightly less technical note, we finish this section by addressing some interesting properties concerning interactions of certain operators in the logic presented: 
'It is not the case that if the agent objectively ought to do something, then it subjectively ought to do it.' Our solution to Example 3 poses a counterexample, because
Conclusion
This work deals with important questions in the modeling of agency, knowledge, and obligation. Formal depictions of such concepts are likely to be useful when it comes to doing machine ethics based on deontic logic and its mechanization. The approach discussed and analyzed here is based on a stit logic of utilitarian 'ought-to-do' enriched with epistemic relations. We argue that to solve certain problems in the treatment of knowledge and obligations within stit -namely Horty's puzzles-one possibility is to distinguish between objective and subjective versions of the ought-to-do modality. Moreover, we show that this possibility comes with formal advantages such as simplicity of semantics and axiomatizability.
A Proof of Soundness Proposition 2. The system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-models.
Proof. Let M = T, ⊏, Choice, {∼ α } α∈Ags , Value O , Value S be an epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-frame. Let V be any pertinent valuation function. The S5 axioms for , [α], K α , as well as axioms (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5), (A6), (Oic), (IA), (OAC), and (U nif − H) are shown to be semantic validities straightforwardly. Since they involve some novelty, we include the detailed proofs for (s.N ), (s.Oic), and (Cl) here.
m and thus m, h |= ϕ. Therefore, we have that h 0 ∈ H m * is such that for every m, h with m * , h 0 ∼ α m, h , m, h |= ϕ. This means that m * , h 0 |= K α ϕ. Therefore, we have that m * , h * |= ♦K α ϕ.
-To see that M (Cl), take m * , h * such that m * , h * |= ⊙ S [α]ϕ. Let m, j be such that m * , h * ∼ α m, j . Take h ∈ H m . We want to show that for ev-
We know that such an action exists, in virtue of (Unif − H) and (OAC). Notice that transitivity of 
On the other hand, we know that there exists a moment m ′′′ such that m * ∼ α m ′′′ and a state S 0 ∈ State
′′ , then an argument similar to the the one we used above to show that our claim was true renders that an action
-Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for preserve validity.
Therefore, we have shown that the system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic bi-valued BT-models.
B Proof of Completeness Definition 5 (Kripke-estit frames).
A Kripke-estit frames allow us to evaluate the formulas of L KO in an analogous fashion to the semantics provided for BT-frames. Therefore, we use the name 'Kripke-estit models' for the structures that result from adding a valuation function to Kripke-estit frames, where the semantics for the formulas of L KO is defined so as to mirror Definition 3. Kripke-estit models can be used for constructing epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-models such that both satisfy the same formulas of L KO :
Definition 6 (Associated BT-frame).
Let For each α ∈ Ags, we define an epistemic relation ∼ α on T W using the set {≈ α } α∈Ags . For a given agent α ∈ Ags, we define
We observe, then, that this definition entails that ∼ α is an equivalence relation for every α ∈ Ags and that, for a given w ∈ W and L ∈ Choice 11 Notice that this implies that, for two worlds v, v ′ in w, vR
Proof. It amounts to showing that the tuple, as defined, validates the semantic conditions (NC), (IA), (OAC), and (Unif − H).
-(NC) is vacuously validated in moment W . It is validated in moments of the form w (w ∈ W ), since two different histories never intersect in a moment later than w). Finally, it is also validated in moments of the form v such that v ∈ W (since there are no moments above v). -For (IA), we reason by cases: a) At moment W , (IA) is validated straightforwardly, since Choice(α, W ) = {H} for each α ∈ Ags. b) For a fixed moment of the form w (with w ∈ W ), let s be a function that assigns to each agent α a member of Choice
T . Since M validates the constraint (IA) K , then we have that
T for every α ∈ Ags, so that α∈Ags s(α) = ∅. c) At moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , if s is a function that assigns to each agent α a member of Choice(v, α), we have that s must be constant and
. This means that v ≈ α v ′ . We want to show that for every h u ∈ Choice
. By definition, we have that this means that u ∈ Choice w α (v). Since M validates the constraint (OAC) K , this last fact implies, with v ≈ α v ′ , that u ≈ α v ′ , which in turn yields that w, h u ∼ α w ′ , h v . b) For situations with moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , we have that (OAC) is met straightforwardly, since for h v , the choice-cell in Choice(α, v) to which h v belongs is just {h v }. c) For situations with moment W , (OAC) is also met straightforwardly, since for every α ∈ Ags, ∼ α is defined such that W, h v ∼ α W, h v ′ for every pair of histories h v , h v ′ in H. -For (Unif − H), again we reason by cases: a) Assume that w, h v ∼ α w ′ , h v ′ (for w, w ′ ∈ W ). This means that v ∈ w, v ′ ∈ w ′ , and v ≈ α v ′ . Let h z ∈ H w (which means that z ∈ w). We want to show that there exists h ∈ H w ′ such that w, h z ∼ α w ′ , h . Condition (U nif − H) K gives us that there exists z ′ ∈ w ′ such that z ≈ α z ′ , which by definiton of ∼ α means that w, h z ∼ α w ′ , h z ′ . b) For situations with moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , we have that v, h v is ∼ α -related only to itself, so that (Unif − H) is met straightforwardly. c) For situations with moment W , (Unif − H) is also met straightforwardly, since
Let M be a Kripke-estit model with valuation function V. The frame upon which M is based has an associated BT-frame. If to the tuple of this BT-frame we add a valuation function V T such that V T (p) = { w, h w ; w ∈ V(p)}, we call the resulting model the epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-model associated to M. Proof. Claim 1. For a given Kripke-estit model M and a fixed w ∈ W Λ , we have that for every L, N ∈ Choice
We will prove Claim 1.only for the strict orderings, since these proofs include the arguments needed to show that the statements for and s also hold.
Similarly, here our assumption yields that there should exist U 0 ∈ State
-(⇒) We assume that L ≺ s N . Let w ′ be such that w ≈ α w ′ , and let U ∈ State
We have that for each w ∈ W , Value S (h w ) = Value S (w), and that for each pair
w ′ α ∩ U . Now, our assumption also yields that there should exist w * such that w ≈ α w * and S 0 ∈ State With that we conclude the proof of Claim 1. For the proof of the main statement, we proceed by induction on ϕ. For the base case, we have that, for a propositional letter p and an arbitrary w ∈ W , M, w p iff w ∈ V(p) iff w, h w ∈ V T (p) iff M T , w, h w p. The cases with the boolean connectives are standard, so let us deal with the modal operators. Let w ∈ W and α ∈ Ags.
-(" ")
We have that M, w ϕ iff for every v ∈ w, M w , v ϕ, which by induction hypothesis happens iff M T , v, h v ϕ for every v ∈ w, which happens iff
Since z ∈ L 0 and M, z ϕ, our assumption entails that there exists
We claim that L T 1 is the choice cell at moment w that will witness to the fact that M T , w, h w ⊙[α]ϕ. In order to show this, we first notice that the first item of
(observe also that v ∈ w and therefore M, v ϕ; in this way, we have that for every h v ∈ L T 1 , the induction hypothesis gives that
By the first item of Claim 1, this last condition implies that L 1 V . Take h v ∈ V T . We know that v ∈ V , so that the fact that L 1 V implies with our assumption that M, v ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives that M T , w, h v ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is true and that 
Here, we claim that L 1 is the choice cell that will witness to the fact that M, w ⊙[α]ϕ. In order to show this, we first notice that the first item of Claim 1 renders that N ≺ L 1 . Next, for every v ∈ L 1 , h v ∈ L T 1 and therefore M T , w, h v ϕ; in this way, we have that for every v ∈ L 1 , the induction hypothesis gives that
T implies with our assumption that M T , w, h v ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives that M, v ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is true and that M w , w ⊙[α]ϕ.
α , so that the fact that M, z ϕ entails with our assumption that there exists
is the choice cell at moment w that will witness to the fact that
In order to show this, we first notice that the second item of Claim 1 renders that
w ′′ α and therefore M, v ϕ; in this way, we have that for every w ′′ such that w ∼ α w ′′ and every
By the second item of Claim 1 , this last condition implies that L 1 s V . Take w ′′ such that w ∼ α w ′′ , and take
w ′′ α , so that the fact that L 1 s V implies with our assumption that M, v ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives that M T , (w ′′ , h v ) ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is true and that
w ′′ α . Here, we claim that L 1 is the choice cell that will witness to the fact that M, w ⊙ S [α]ϕ. In order to show this, we first notice that the second item of Claim 1 renders that N ≺ s L 1 . Next, for every w ′′ such that w ≈ α w ′′ (which implies that w ∼ α w ′′ ) and every
w ′′ α and therefore M T , (w ′′ , h v ) ϕ; in this way, we have that for every for every w ′′ such that w ≈ α w ′′ and every
s L T implies with our assumption that M T , (w ′′ , h v ) ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives that M, v ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is true and that M, w ⊙ S [α]ϕ.
B.1 Canonical Kripke-estit models
We will show that the proof system Λ is complete with respect to the class of Kripkeestit models (and thus use Proposition 4 to show completeness with respect to the class of epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-models). The strategy is to build a canonical structure from the syntax.
Definition 7 (Canonical Structure). The tuple
Λ , the set {v ∈ W Λ ; wR v} is denoted by w.
-Choice is a function that assigns to each α and w a subset of P(w), which will be denoted by Choice 
Proposition 5. The canonical structure M for Λ is a Kripke-estit model.
Proof. We need to show that the tuple W Λ , R , Choice, {≈ α } α∈Ags , Value O , Value S is a Kripke-estit frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates the five items in the definition of Krioke-estir models.
1. It is clear that R is an equivalence relation, since Λ includes the S5 axioms for . 2. Since Λ includes the S5 axioms for [α] (for each α ∈ Ags), we have that R w α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags and w ∈ W Λ . Moreover, since Λ includes p → [α]p as an axiom schema, we have that R α ⊆ R . In this way, Choice indeed assigns to each α and w a partition of w. Now, we must verify that M validates the constraint (IA) K . In order to do that, we need two intermediate results: a) For a fixed w * ∈ W Λ , we have that w ∈ w * iff { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. (⇒) Let w ∈ w * (which means that w * R w). Take ϕ a formula of L KO such that ϕ ∈ w * . Since w * is closed under Modus Ponens, the (4) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w * as well. Therefore, by the definition of R , we get that ϕ ∈ w. (⇐) We assume that { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. Take ϕ a formula of L KO such that ϕ ∈ w * . By our assumption, we get that ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that ϕ ∈ w * implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that w * R w and w ∈ w * . b) For a fixed w * ∈ W Λ and s : Ags → P(w * ) a function that maps α to a member of Choice
. By our assumption, we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for [α] implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that [α]ϕ ∈ v s(α) implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that v s(α) R w * α w and w ∈ s(α). Next, we will show that for a fixed w * ∈ W Λ and s : Ags → P(w * ) a function that maps α to a member of Choice w * α such as in item b) above, we have that α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } is Λ-consistent. First, we will show that α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent. Suppose that this is not the case. Then there exists a set {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } of formulas of L KO such that [α i ]ϕ i ∈ v s(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
Without loss of generality, we assume that α i = α j for all j = i such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} -this assumption hinges on the fact that any stit operator distributes over conjunction. Notice that the fact that
Since w * is closed under conjunction, we also have that
By the independence-of-agents axiom, we have that
Therefore, equations (2) and (1), imply that
But this is a contradiction, since we had seen that
and w * is a Λ-MCS. Therefore, α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent. Next, we show that the union α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } is also consistent. Suppose that this is not the case. Since α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent, there must exist sets {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } and
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θ i ∈ w * for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
Let θ = θ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ m . Since distributes over conjunction, we have that θ = θ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ m , where it is important to mention that since w * is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ w * . In these terms, (4) implies that
Once again, we assume without loss of generality that α i = α j for all j = i such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogous to the procedure we used to show that
This entails that ♦¬ θ ∈ w * , but this is a contradiction, since the fact that θ ∈ w * implies with the (4) axiom for that θ ∈ w * . Now, let u * be the Λ-MCS that includes α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * }. By the intermediate result a), it is clear that u * ∈ w * . By the intermediate result b), it is clear that u * ∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags. Therefore, we have shown that for a fixed w * ∈ W , we have that each function s : Ags → P(w * ) that maps α to a member of Choice w * α is such that α∈Ags s(α) = ∅, which means that M validates the constraint (IA) K . 3. Since the axiom system Λ includes the S5 axioms for K α for each α ∈ Ags, we have that ≈ α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags. We must now verify that M validates the constraints (OAC) K and (Unif − H) K . i) For (OAC) K , fix w * ∈ W Λ and α ∈ Ags. We assume that v, u ∈ w * are such
Similarly, since all substitutions of the (OAC) axiom lie within v ′ and it is closed under Modus Ponens, we get that [α]K α ϕ also lies in v ′ . Since v ′ R α v, this implies that K α ϕ ∈ v. Therefore, our assumption that v ≈ α u entails that ϕ ∈ u. With this, we have shown that the fact that K α ϕ ∈ v ′ implies that ϕ ∈ u, which means that
We assume that there exist v ∈ w 1 and u ∈ w 2 such that v ≈ α u. Take v ′ ∈ w 1 .
We will show that u ′′ = {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ u} is consistent. In order to do so, we will first show that {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } is consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧ ψ n → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } means that K α ψ i ∈ v ′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; by necessitation of K α and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that
Next, we show that u ′′ = {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ u} is also consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Since {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } is consistent, there must exist sets {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } and {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } of formulas of
Since distributes over conjunction, we have that θ = θ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ m , where it is important to mention that since u is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ u and θ ∈ u as well (⋆). In this way, (a) implies that ⊢ ϕ → ¬ θ and thus that ⊢ ♦ϕ → ♦¬ θ (b). Now, by necessitation of
so that (c) and the facts that v contains all substitutions of the (U nif − H) axiom and is closed under Modus Ponens entail that K α ♦ϕ ∈ v. Now, this last inclusion implies, with our assumption that v ≈ α u, that ♦ϕ ∈ u, which by (b) in turn yields that ♦¬ θ ∈ u, contradicting (⋆). Therefore, u ′′ is consistent. Finally, let u ′ be the Λ-MCS that includes u ′′ . It is clear from its construction that u ′ ∈ u = w 2 and that v ′ ≈ α u ′ , With this, we have shown that M validates the constraint (Unif − H) K . 4. Both Value O and Value S are well defined functions with range within R.
As is usual with canonical structures, our objective is to prove the so-called truth lemma, which says that for every formula ϕ of L KO and every w ∈ W Λ , we have that M n , w ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w. This is done by induction on ϕ, and the inductive step for each modal operator requires previous results (such as the important existence lemmas). In the case of , K α , and [α], these previous results are standard (Lemma 1 below). However, in the case of ⊙[α] and ⊙ S [α], the previous results require a lot of work. In Lemmas 2 and 3 below, we pinpoint the main claims that we need to show the inductive step of the truth lemma for the ought operators. Each item in these two lemmas is shown by a series of sub-lemmas, and the reader is advised to carefully go over the full proofs provided in the supplement to the present work.
Lemma 1 (Existence). Let M be the canonical Kripke-estit model for Λ. Let w ∈ W Λ . For a given formula ϕ of L KO , the following hold:
Proof. Let w ∈ W Λ , and take ϕ a formula of L KO .
(⇒)
We assume that ϕ ∈ w. If v lies within w, this means that wR v holds. Therefore, ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that ϕ / ∈ w. We will show that there is a world in w such that ϕ does not lie within it. For this, let v ′ = {ψ; ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by virtue of the following argument: suppose for a contradiction that v ′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧ψ n → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ means that ψ i ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; due to necessitation of and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS which, being closed under conjunction, includes ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n . Now, we define v ′′ = v ′ ∪ {¬ϕ}, and show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v ′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b) implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ϕ (c); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, then ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ∈ w, so that (c) and the fact that w is closed under Modus Ponens entail that ϕ ∈ w, contradicting the initial assumption that ϕ / ∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v ′′ . On one hand, it is clear from its construction that ϕ / ∈ v and that wR v. Thus, we have shown that assuming that ϕ / ∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ w such that ϕ / ∈ v. 2. (⇒) We assume that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Let v ∈ w such that wR α v. The definition of R α straightforwardly gives that ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that [α]ϕ / ∈ w. We will show that there is a world v in w such that wR α v and such that ϕ does not lie within it. For this, let v ′ = {ψ; [α]ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by a similar argument than the one introduced in the proof of the above item: suppose for a contradiction that v ′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ means that [α]ψ i ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; necessitation of [α] and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that
, and we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v ′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v ′′ . On one hand, it is clear from its construction that ϕ / ∈ v and that wR α v, by definition of R α . On the other, axiom (A2) renders that actually v ∈ w (if θ ∈ w, then [α]θ ∈ w and thus θ ∈ v). Therefore, we have shown that assuming that [α]ϕ / ∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ w such that wR α v and ϕ / ∈ v. 3. (⇒) We assume that K α ϕ ∈ w. Let v ∈ W Λ such that w ≈ α v. The definition of ≈ α straightforwardly gives that ϕ ∈ v. (⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that K α ϕ / ∈ w. We will show that there is a world v in W Λ such that w ≈ α v and such that ϕ does not lie within it. For this, let v ′ = {ψ; K α ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by an argument similar to the one introduced in the proofs of the above items: suppose for a contradiction that v ′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ means that K α ψ i ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; necessitation of K α and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that ⊢ K α ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧ K α ψ n → K α ⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS which, being closed under conjunction, includes K α ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ K α ψ n . Now, we define v ′′ = v ′ ∪ {¬ϕ} v ′′ = v ′ ∪ {¬ϕ}, and we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v ′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KO such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of K α and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b) implies that ⊢ K α ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ K α ψ n → K α ϕ (b); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, then K α ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ K α ψ n ∈ w, so that (b) and the fact that w is closed under Modus Ponens entail that K α ϕ ∈ w, contradicting the initial assumption that K α ϕ / ∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v ′′ . On one hand, it is clear from its construction that ϕ / ∈ v and that w ≈ α v, by definition of ≈ α . Thus, we have shown that assuming that K α ϕ / ∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ W Λ such that w ≈ α v and ϕ / ∈ v. Proof. (a) Claim 1. Let M be the canonical Kripke-estit model for Λ. We have that the following hold: -For w * ∈ W Λ , w ∈ w * iff { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. -For any pair of agents α, α ∈ Ags and any formula ϕ of L KO , ⊙[α]ϕ → ¬ ⊙
[α]¬ϕ ∈ w for every w ∈ W Λ . We will refer to this property as "consistency of ought-to-do". The proof of the first item goes as follows: (⇒) Let w ∈ w * (which means that w * R w). Take ϕ a formula of L KO such that ϕ ∈ w * . Since w * is closed under Modus Ponens, the (4) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w * as well. Therefore, by definition of R , we get that ϕ ∈ w. (⇐) We assume that { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. Take ϕ a formula of L KO such that ϕ ∈ w * . By our assumption, we get that ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that ϕ ∈ w * implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that w * R w and w ∈ w * . The proof of the second item is a direct consequence from the fact that, for α, β ∈ Ags and ϕ a formula of L KO 
Let θ = θ 1 ∧· · · ∧θ m . Since distributes over conjunction, we have that θ = θ 1 ∧· · ·∧ θ m , where it is important to mention that since w is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ w. In these terms, (8) implies that ⊢ ([α]ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕ n ) → ¬ θ. By necessitation of the ought-to-do operator, its axiom (K), and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that
